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1 Because  of  his  unwavering  commitment  to  fight  disciplinary  and  mental  closure,
William James is an author who has invited scholars from the most disparate fields to
review aspects of his eclectic and far-reaching body of work. Not only philosophers,
psychologists, historians of medicine and religion, but also artists, political theorists,
and social  activists  have productively engaged James’s  rich and variegated writings
with  the  goal  to  reconstructing  seminal  portions  of  our  intellectual,  cultural,  and
political history as well to foreseeing viable options for the intellectual, cultural, and
political  challenges  awaiting  us  in  the  future  presents.  What  makes  Throntveit’s
volume a valuable addition to such enlightened literature is its succesful attempt to
engage James at the under-explored “boundaries” (to use Francesca Bordogna’s apt and
catchy  expression)  of  ethics  and  politics,  provocatively  dislodging  a  number  of
assumptions – mostly advocated by those readers unimpressed with, or unsympathetic
to, James’s effort to draw novel infra-disciplinary relations and envisage novel intra-
disciplinary  assumptions  – governing  our  current  compartmental  thinking  in  such
areas.  Rather  than  trying  to  force  James  in  any  of  the  (often  quite  narrow)
contemporary philosophical categories purportedly justifying the jungle of curricula,
labels, and headings featuring our academic formation, scholarly work, and job market,
driven at  and voted to  the hyper-specialization and hyper-comparimentalization of
thinking and research,  the author conveys us  the full  breadth and scale  of  James’s
ecumenical yet extremely precise ethical-political investigations.
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2 Throntveit’s  exercise  in  interpretative  dynamicity  and  theoretical  pluralism  gets
manifested in the very title  of  his  work:  the book in fact  investigates James’s  quest
(rather than a treatise or theory) for an ethical republic (a concept whose contours are
promiscuously shared by morality and politics). Rather than as a treatise or theory on
some confined and discrete subject matter whose confines are well-known and agreed
upon in advance by the inquirers, James’s moral and political thought is depicted and
assessed as a pursuit of, and journey in, a field with ambiguous contours and hidden
potentialities  to  be  playfully  explored.  This  imaginative  hermeneutical  angle  is
reflected in the very organization and style of the book, which looks less as a closed and
definitive assessment of James’s views and more as an open-ended exploration of some
overlooked  motives  featuring  his  writings.  Enriched  by  a  wealth  of  bibliographical
documentation –  the author has  a  solid  grip on James’s  unpublished materials  and
manuscripts, which he puts in productive dialogue with most well known pages of his
work –, the book will be both a superb introduction to James’s practical philosophy for
newcomers as well as an indispensable guide for more seasoned readers of his oeuvre.
Throntveit’s  work  joins  a  fortunate  trend  of  studies  currently  engaged  in  a  re-
assessment and re-evaluation of James’s ethical investigations against the background
of his wider philosophical views and intellectual persona – an ensemble comprising not
only intellectual historians (alongside Throntveit, one might list Paul Croce and James
Campbell) and philosophers (e.g. Sergio Franzese and Colin Koopman), but also political
scientists  (Kennan Ferguson and Alex  Livingston)  and scholars  of  religion  (Michael
Slater and Jeremy Carrette).
3 The volume comprises a short introduction plus five chapters on, respectively, James’s
elaboration of his pragmatism against the background of his complex family ties and
shifting cultural milieu (Chapter 1); his earlier and later ethical-religious incursions,
adjustments,  and  revisions  (Chapter  2);  his  conception  of  the  “ethical  republic”  as
articulated in his most canonical ethical writings from the 1890’s (Chapter 3); James’s
public personae and presence in the social and political debates of his time, an aspect
often downplayed in the secondary literature (Chapter 4); and his intellectual legacy
and  fortune  in  the  twentieth  and  now  twentieth-first  century,  with  a  particular
emphasis  on  the  American  scene  (Chapter  5).  What  is  most  appreciable  about  the
volume is the balance between theoretical and historical details: nearly every insight,
twist or turn in James’s intellectual work is backed up with an informed reconstruction
of the wider personal relations and conditions informing it. This is done in the belief
that a thinker such as James simply cannot be understood without not so much reading
his philosophy alongside with his biography, but rather without reading his philosophy
within his biography (and the other way around). Throntveit is particularly effective in
rendering a picture of James as a moral thinker deeply engaged in moral questions and
whose life was literary articulated by recurring moral concerns: his moral thought was
for  the  sake  of  his  ethical  mind and socio-political  will,  and his  ordinary  practical
dilemmas delved deep into his intellectual investigations.
4 In a sea of interesting insights and elegant interpretative choices, I would like to pick
out and highlight three particularly original and useful items: the characterization of
James’s close relationship with his father, the account of James’s understanding of the
relationship between ethics and religion, and the presentation of James’s voice as an
engaged citizen of the pragmatist ethical republic. For what regards the first aspect, in
chapter one Throntveit does a great job in flashing out James’s unbroken wrestling
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with his father’s religious-moral outlook, which would eventually shape his own views
on why and how the spiritual and the ethical life should communicate or rather part
ways. If there are to date a number of fine works investigating James’s intricate bond
with his old man, Throntveit’s stands out not because it gives us new details about such
conflicting yet passionate bond but rather because it rearranges what we know already
in a congenial way, showing for example how many of James’s reservations about the
uncritical identification of ethics and religion can be brought back to the resistance of
his father’s subjugation of the moral life to the holy one.
5 This feature is then showed at work, in chapter two, in the very helpful discussion of
James’s prolonged interest in religion in the context of his ethical investigations, which
represents the second aspect of the book I would de like to stress. As against those
interpreters who read James as variously claiming that the moral life simply could not
be led independently from the religious one, that moral beliefs should wait on religious
faith, or that meaningful willful action should be backed up by metaphysical-religious
considerations, the author reads James (both in “The Will to Believe” and in Varieties of
Religious Experience) as an author surely interested in making room for religious appeals
and in showing the many short-circuits between religious considerations and ethical
ones, yet resisting to ground (or, given the context, to incardinate) morality on some
religious  anthropology  or  metaphysics  we  ought  to  respect.  I  find  this  move  as
necessary as liberating, since James is still too-often recounted as an author driven by
some sacred zeal and on a mission to rescue over-beliefs as features and constituents of
the world rather than of our possible pragmatic stance toward it, despite the textual
evidence of the contrary – that is the several instances in which James claimed to be
blessed by no religious faith and that his respect for religion and defense of the right to
believe is motivated by religion being one of the things we do with ourselves, focusing in
fact on religious practices (which can grow or shrink in meaning accordingly to their
place  in  our  lives)  rather  than  on  religious  doctrines  –  which  are  true  or  false
independently from our ways of taking them in. This is obviously a nagging quarrel,
and despite being in disagreement with some of Throntveit’s views on the matter (for
example his emphasis on James’s alleged “moralism” or on religion’s chief “auxiliary”
role as being that of fostering the moral life), I think that his voice outside the choir is
most valuable.
6 Finally,  for what regards the third aspect of the volume I’de like to emphasize,  the
author does a fine job in offering us a lesser known facet of James: namely, his first-
hand socio-political  involvement in the problems and discussions of his time. Sadly
enough,  even  those  works  addressing  James’s  socio-political  aspect  of  his  moral
thought  scarcely  mention  this  important  side  of  his  pragmatism,  and  the  author
displays in full his acquaintance with the intellectual history of America at the turn of
the  century,  to  which  James  contributed  in  no  small  portion.  What  is  particularly
insightful  is  the relation drawn between James’s  quasi-methodological  refutation of
“bigness”  and  “greatness”  (as  against  the  “molecular  moral  forces  that  work  from
individual to individual”) with the identification of James’s most positive “pragmatist
polity” to be found in some of his writings and addresses for the wider public. One of
the  open  questions  of  James’s  scholarship  is  in  fact  how  to  square  his  several
admonitions to look for particular solutions in pragmatism’s open-ended analyses and
diagnoses (suggesting rather to drawn them ourselves in our practical  life)  and his
several  answers  to  the  most  pressing  socio-political  quests  of  his  time.  Throntveit
suggests to read such answers as the possible outcomes of those analyses and diagnoses
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with which we readers  have to  experiment  ourselves,  thus testing their  validity  in
deed. If thus for James the chief socio-political challenge is “the problem of individual
or  minority  interests  at  odds  with  more  powerful  or  popular  agendas”  (110-1)  –
admittedly a problem still  with us despite the radically different shape it  took in a
globalized environment alien from James’s –, than in reading the ingredients of James’s
democratic  republicanism  (consisting  in  the  nurturing  of  the  ethical  virtues  of
experimentalism, historical wisdom and empathy as “practiced in the context of power
relations and the institutions that regulate them” (111)), we are called up to test the
viability and fittingness of  this project in the world we live in.  In this context,  the
author suggests, taking a look at the historical feasibility and success of such option
tells  us  a  lot  about  its  philosophical  strength:  to  give  the reader  but  one example,
James’s campaign to widen one’s (nation’s) ethical-political imagination is related by
Throntveit  to  his  strenuous  resistance  to  the  expansionist  policy  of  the  Cleveland,
McKinley,  and Roosevelt  administrations,  showing the difference in their respective
understanding of what would count as an ethically permissible expansion of the moral
energy at the heart of our individual and collective life.
7 Having surveyed some of its themes and highlights, in the remaining of this review I
shall  briefly  voice  a  few  concerns  I  have  with  selected  reconstructive  nuances  of
Throntveit’s book. Despite my disagreement with the author is at times not so small,
still I indulge in no rhetoric in saying that the book is a must-read for James’s scholars
as well as for those intrigued by his revolutionary philosophical method and agenda. I
myself have learned a great deal about James and ethics despite the reservations I will
voice  in  the  below  in  the  hope  of  opening  up  a  new,  productive  front  in  James’s
scholarship and in ethical thinking more widely.
8 A  first  doubt  I  have  with  Throntveit’s  reconstruction  hinges  on  his  particular
characterization of the ethical quality of pragmatism. Despite applauding his reproach
of those “narrow” accounts of James’s moral thought down focusing exclusively on his
“explicitly ethical writings,” Throntveit’s “holistic analysis” seems to me still affected
by the very attempt of narrowing the scope of James’s moral thought down to the ideas
expressed in such writings, only backing them up with a larger body of works, adding
in this way more details to what is however agreed to be James’s core ethical concern.
That is, it seems to me that Throntveit’s operation to widen the list of morally relevant
texts beyond the customary three of four usually taken into considerations by James’s
friends and foes alike – surely a laudable operation in itself, both historiographically
and  philosophically  –  is  however  not  moved  by  an  attempt  to  radically  revise  the
picture we have of his moral thought (and thus of what moral philosophy as a whole is
about), but rather by the goal to show how such picture can be extended to ever further
areas  of  concern –  social  and political  thought  being the main targets.  The author
disagrees  in  fact  with  the  orthodox reading of  James  as  an individualist  utilitarian
thinker because such reading is blind to a whole different set of considerations (the
“necessary components of a nonutulitarian pragmatist ethics”) present in other less
trodden  writings,  showing  his  openness  to  endorse  all  sorts  of  moral  principles,
utilitarian or not, as long as they fit the needs of the problematic situation we find
ourselves in.  For Throntveit,  not differently from what the vast majority of James’s
scholars and readers have claimed in various ways, James’s chief moral problem would
have been that of assessing conflicting preferences both in our individual and in our
collective life, and his answer, articulated (hence appreciable) not only in his canonical
ethical texts but rather in the wider archipelago of his psychological, epistemological,
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metaphysical,  and  religious  writings,  would  be  that  of  endowing  us  with  rich
descriptions  of  the  variety  of  considerations  at  stake  in  such  decisions.  Now  this
invitation is no doubt part of what James is doing in these texts, and yet if we focus on
this aspect only we would be blind to several other related movements (hence partial to
the revolutionary character of James’s work) such as his stress that moral problems
often concern impediments in our visions and attitude rather than mere shortage of
resoluteness in action. And if this is the case, then his overall conception of what ethics
is about will inevitably shift, moving away from a complex casuistry involving moral
unity and consistency, where the ethical challenge comes from the coherence of one’s
actions  with  one’s  ideals,  and  resembling  more  an  ethics  of  self-fashioning  and
transformation, where the ethical challenge is that of imagining ever new possibilities
for self-expression.
9 This shift has consequences for the way in which we read James’s metaphilosophical
and moral  investigations alike as  instruments for  ameliorating the moral  life.  Once
agreed  that  James  is  not  offering  us  philosophical  solutions  to  ordinary  problems,
hence  philosophical  foundations  of  our  ordinary  practices  –  and here  I  once  again
happily agree with the author’s  heterodox reading resisting those interpretation of
James  the  moral  philosopher  as  some  sort  of  moral  theorist  dispensing  ethical
prescriptions  for  our  conducts  –  I  part  ways  with  Throntveit  in  thinking  that  this
different picture of what moral thought is and does should however still be concerned
(or,  I  would  say,  obsessed)  with  the  actions  and  policies  of  individuals  in  their
singularity or collectivity, claiming rather how this shift opens up the way to a more
radical understanding of ethics revolving around the key notions of self-conduct – where
both the reflexive prefix and its object do mark a tremendous difference from the mere
reference to actions and their consequences,  disclosing at the very same time a far
more interesting understanding of pragmatism as a philosophy not so much concerned
with  the  consequence  of  thought  on  action  (rightly  liable  to  the  accusation  of
instrumentalism) but rather with the consequences of thought on the way we conduct
ourselves midst problematic practical situations. To put it in a nutshell, it is only when
we see James as concerned with the moral significance of the conduct of the self on the
self, that is with the manifold considerations which enter in the representation and
transformation  of what  we  do  with  ourselves,  rather  than  simply  with  the
consequences  of  our  thoughts  in  action,  that  we  are  able  to  appreciate  James’s
dissatisfaction with  the  narrow  picture  of  ethics  as  the  justification  and
implementation of principles and rules of behavior voiced all over his work – both in
his “explicit” and most known moral writings such as “The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral Life” and “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings”, and in his “implicit” and
less known ones such as his earlier writings on psychology and his later ones on truth.
10 This is visible in the way in which Throntveit speaks about the three Jamesian virtues
of the ethical republic, that is the virtues that an ethical citizen should nurture in order
to successfully meet the challenges of the pluralist society s/he (inevitably) lives in.
The experimental “willingness to reflect critically on our values and change them,” the
historical  wisdom  given  by  the  “awareness  of  the  practical  needs  and  contingent
factors  that  had  driven  the  ethical  experiments  in  the  past,”  and  the  emphatic
“recognition that others’ value were facts of experience against which our own must be
tested” are for Throntveit’s James to be implemented for the sake of ameliorating the
moral life, relieving it from practical conflict and misunderstanding. The focus is once
again on the consequences of one’s actions with respects to the collectivity, and action
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itself is conceived as some sort of neutral, effortless device of thought (of ideals and
values, in the specific case). Contrary to this interpretation, and indeed in line with the
way in which the author cashes out the details of the three ethical virtues (102-8), I
suggest to read James as primarily interested on how we shape and transform ourselves
in conduct, that is how the conducts expressive of our mobile sense of selfhood can
touch,  or  fail  to, the lives and conducts of others.  Seen this  way,  one’s  actions are
revealing of who we are and how we might be otherwise,  and the very capacity to
acknowledge  and  register  what  is  needed  from  us  in  a  certain  situation  (e.g.  the
suffering of my fellow beings or the tragic sense of injustice attached to some socio-
political  configurations)  is  a  function  of  our  readiness  to  imagining  us  conducting
ourselves otherwise.
11 What I find missing in Throntveit’s James is then the crucial emphasis on the effects of
critical, reflective thinking on the self’s ongoing challenging of her own subjectivity in
conduct (a subjectivity always shaped by the alterity of the others and of one’s further
selves alike), which is simply overlooked if we present the self’s and other’s values and
desires as given to us and simply in need to be registered and added to the casuistry
calculus. According to my radical James, we do experience them in the sense that we make
them in experience while remaking ourselves rather than finding them in experience
hence  adjusting  our  actions  accordingly  –for  James  (and  Dewey,  in  this  respect)
experience  is  always  Erfahrung rather  than  merely  Erlebnis. If  this  is  so,  then  the
empathetic historical experimentalist attitude rightly emphasized by Throntveit is thus
a practical goal moved by the appreciation of the responsibility attached to one’s way
of  conducting oneself  rather than a  demand normatively  attached to  the reality  of
things independently from our recognition of their demandingness and willingness to
submit  to it.  The author works with a somewhat mechanicistic  and instrumentalist
conception of human agency, whose goal is to fulfill one’s subjective desires and square
them with the intersubjective/objectivite demands posed by others (see.  e.g.  2,  86),
rather than with a perfectionist  one,  aimed at  attaining a better relationships with
oneself and others, hence attaining better versions of ourselves with others, through
the  monitoring  of  the  ways  in  which  we  conduct  ourselves  in  community  and
encounter the other in conduct.
12 James  wrote  at  a  time  in  which  academic  writing  was  ideally  thought  of  as  a
constitutive part  of  the intellectual  upbringing of  learned citizens rather than as  a
literary genre appealing for a few elected spirits versed in abstract speculation only,
and strived to present pragmatism as a philosophical sensibility best equipped to talk
to the ordinary life (not to a rarified version of it) and address real problems (rather
than  “paper”  ones)  without  renouncing  argumentative  rigor  and  inventiveness  –
reprising  in  this  way  the  best  teachings  and  accomplishments  of  the  venerable
understanding and practice of philosophy as a reflective way of life. In the case of his
philosophical investigations of ethics and the moral life, James’s work looks less like a
technical treatise or theory dispensing more-or-less viable ready-made solutions and
more  like  an  invitation  to  perform  ourselves  the  hard  task  of  self-questioning
accompanied by a set of reflective tools hopefully helping us performing such seminal
task. We should rediscover this ideal and lesson, and try to implement it in our current
philosophical and ethical debates. Throntveit’s book helps us immensely to do exactly
that, giving us a lead to fruitfully unpack James’s work and put it back together for the
sake of the contemporary world we live in and life of the mind we lead as a response to
its challenges. Our James differ in the measure in which he believes that such operation
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can  be  pursued  by  leaving  the  action-principles  centered  model  of  modern  and
contemporary moral philosophy intact while I suggest that we go back to a conception
of philosophy and of ethics as the art of self-fashioning animating selected moments of
antiquity, and reprised by James and others (both within and outside pragmatism) at
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